My research focuses on Kant's theoretical philosophy. I am especially interested in the conception of space Kant puts forward in the Critique of Pure Reason. He argues that space is the form of our sensibility, our capacity to be affected by objects. This view is quite difficult to understand. I approach it by focusing on the question "What kind of difference does space make to how we conceptualize objects?"
I show how we gain insights into the role of space for our conception of objects by focusing on Kant's discussions of what he calls incongruent counterparts. These are objects that are similar in shape and equal in size, but which cannot be superimposed. An example is the pair of our left and right hand. Our left hand is pretty much of the same size as our right. And they seem to have the same shape (e.g., for every feature that I can point out on my left hand, I can find an exact corresponding one on my right, and vice versa). But a left-hand glove does not fit onto a right hand.
In my dissertation I explain how these objects reveal the role of space for our conception of objects. They show that space as a three-dimensional whole is prior to objects. Thinking of the whole of space as an overall system of organization, this means that the way in which objects together form an overall system is prior to the objects themselves. Moreover, they show that the priority of this system of organization is such that this system makes a difference to the way in which we conceptualize objects.
They show that instead of conceptualizing objects directly and as being independent of one another, we conceptualize them indirectly by means of this system of organization. A way to frame this is that we conceptualize objects as parts of a common world. This view contrasts to a view held by Leibniz. According to Leibniz, space does not figure into our conception of objects. He thinks that we conceptualize objects not indirectly as parts of a world, but directly and as being (in a radical sense) independent of one another.
Here are abstracts for some papers that grow out of my dissertation research:
1. "How to Construct Hands. A Guide on the Essentials. (Recommended for Leibnizians)" (under review)
In his essay On the First Ground of the Distinction of Regions in Space from 1768 Kant argues that absolute space has a reality of its own, independent of bodies and as a ground of the compositeness of matter. Part of his argument is based on incongruent counterparts, objects that are similar in shape and equal in size, but which cannot be superimposed. An example of such objects is our left and right hand. According to a standard reading of this essay, Kant is giving an apagogic, i.e., an indirect argument. He is taken to argue for an absolutist, Newtonian conception of space by way of ruling out the Leibnizian alternative, according to which space comes down to relations among objects. Interpretations of this kind are given by Peter Remnant, John Earman, and Graham Nerlich, to name just a few. In this paper I argue for an alternative interpretation of Kant's argument. Instead of arguing for an absolutist conception by way of ruling out the Leibnizian alternative, I argue that Kant's claim is that the core idea of the Leibnizian conception, the idea of the situation [situs] of objects, presupposes space as an independent, three-dimensional whole. I make this point by focusing on two often neglected parts of the essay, a discussion of what Kant calls regions in space, and his explanation of how to construct the incongruent counterpart to an object such as a hand.
2. "How Sensibility's A Priori Form Matters"
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that our cognition of objects does not only involve the faculty of understanding, that is, the faculty by means of which we can conceptualize objects. But he thinks that our sensibility, our faculty by means of which we can be affected by objects, contributes to our cognition as well. Sensibility, he argues, has its own a priori structures, so-called forms, that figure essentially into our cognition. One of these forms is space. In this paper, I argue that the main difference space, as the form of sensibility, makes to our cognition is that objects are conceptualized as parts of a common world. And I argue that this is the main point at which Kant deviates from Leibniz's view. For according to Leibniz we conceptualize objects as being independent of one another. I focus on a part of the Critique, commonly referred to as the Amphiboly. In this section, Kant contrasts his view of cognition to Leibniz's. Against the common view, held by, e.g., Derk Pereboom, that the main contrast Kant makes between his and Leibniz's view is with respect to the conceptual pair of inner and outer, I argue that Kant's discussion of the pair of matter and form reveals the basic contrast between Kant and Leibniz, and that this basic contrast concerns the difference that the priority of space as a whole makes for our conception of objects.
3. "Grasping Incongruence: Kant's Argument in §13 of the Prolegomena"
In §13 of the Prolegomena Kant argues that incongruent counterparts pose a paradox for a view according to which space and time are qualities of things in themselves. He argues that a solution of this paradox requires that objects must be thought of as appearances. I reconstruct Kant's argument drawing on the way in which he contrasts his model of cognition to Leibniz's in the Amphiboly. I argue that incongruent counterparts pose a paradox for a view according to which the intellect is the sole faculty of cognition because such a view conceptualizes the objects as being independent of one another. And I motivate Kant's solution, which says that the inner determination of such objects is only possible through their outer relation to space, as saying that our grasp of the difference between a left and a right hand reveals the need for a model according to which objects are conceptualized as parts of a world, and that this is ensured by taking our understanding to be conditioned by space as the form of our sensibility.
4. "Kant's Conception of Form in his Inaugural Dissertation"
Drawing on two of Kant's pre-critical writings, his Nova Dilucidatio from 1755, and his essay The Only Possible Proof of the Existence of God from 1763, I argue that the conception of form that Kant puts forward in his Inaugural Dissertation from 1770 is intended to address one of the main issues he sees in Leibniz's philosophy. According to Leibniz's conception of substances, i.e., monads, objects cannot really stand in any dynamical relations to one another. Any appearance of such a relation is merely due to a pre-established harmony. Hoping to work out a possible conception of substances and their origin that makes possible the formers' actual outward relatability, I explain how Kant's conception of form address this problem. I also explain how the view of the intellect that Kant holds in his Dissertation gets in the way of successfully overcoming this problem: as he himself realizes, he needs to change his view of the intellect as relating directly to things as they are in themselves.
5. "Against the Leibnizians: Euler and Kant on Absolute Space"
In a short essay from 1748, Euler argues for an absolutist conception of space. The basis for his argument is Newton's first law of mechanics, the law of inertia. A few years later, in an essay from 1768, Kant also argues for an absolutist conception of space. But Kant bases his argument on more geometrical considerations. In this essay Kant comments on Euler's argument saying that although Euler points to a difficulty with the major alternative conception to the Newtonian one, namely the Leibnizian conception, Euler's argument fails as it leaves unconsidered the difficulties that come with the application of the laws of motion in the concrete. In this paper I compare Euler's and Kant's arguments and argue that Kant's argument accomplishes where he sees Euler's argument failing.