Research

My research focuses on Kant's theoretical philosophy, and in particular on how he thinks reality is intelligible to us. In my dissertation, I examine the role that space plays in this. For Kant, space is not a feature of the world as it is independently of us, but he thinks space is grounded in us — specifically, in the cognitive capacity that enables us to have sensible representations of things, such as perceptions.

I argue that we can gain new insights into the significance of this view by focusing on Kant's discussions of a special kind of difference: that between so-called incongruent counterparts. These are objects that are similar in shape and same in size, yet cannot be superimposed on one another — our left and right hands being the most familiar example. (Scientists often speak of chirality to describe this phenomenon, which appears across many domains, including in the structure of our DNA.)

My central claim is that, for Kant, the difference between incongruent counterparts reveals that space as a whole shapes the way reality is intelligible to us. More specifically, we cognize objects not as isolated entities, but as parts of a single, shared world.

The significance of this claim comes into sharper focus when set against the view of Kant's predecessor, Leibniz. As a rationalist, Leibniz held that our sensible capacities make no substantial contribution to how reality is intelligible to us, and that space plays no role in this either. On his account, objects are intelligible independently of one another — not as parts of one common world.

The following are abstracts for papers that grow out of my dissertation research:

1. "Constructing a Counterpart"

In his 1768 essay Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space, Kant argues that the difference between incongruent counterparts is grounded in space as a whole. This paper argues that the way in which incongruent counterparts involve space illuminates the sense in which Kant took Leibniz’s conception of reality as too abstract. After motivating a renewed look at Kant’s essay, I first discuss his notion of directions in space. I explain Kant’s point that a judgment as the position of object presupposes a judgment as to the direction in space. This shows one way in which Kant wants to motivate the point that something is left too abstract if a certain kind of difference is neglected. I then to Kant’s discussion of incongruent counterparts. I first show how the difference between incongruent counterparts is grounded in space as a whole by focusing on Kant’s discussion of the construction of a counterpart to a given chiral object and explain how this reveals space to be a ground of determination. I then discuss the philosophical significance Kant assigns to this, namely that there is an inner difference that is grounded in an overall unity.

2. "How Sensibility's A Priori Form Matters"

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that our a priori cognition of objects does not only involve the faculty of understanding, that is, the faculty by means of which we can conceptualize objects. But he thinks that our sensibility, our faculty by means of which we can be affected by objects, contributes to our a priori cognition as well. Sensibility, he argues, has its own a priori structures, so-called forms. One of these forms is space. In this paper, I argue that the main difference space, as the form of sensibility, makes to our a priori cognition is that objects are conceptualized as parts of a common world. I argue that this is the point at which Kant deviates from especially from Leibniz's view. So Kant takes a world-first view, where Leibniz takes a substances-first view. I focus on a part of the Critique, commonly referred to as the Amphiboly, in which Kant contrasts his view of how we conceptualize objects to Leibniz's. Against the common interpretative approach, taken by, e.g., Derk Pereboom, which takes the conceptual pair of inner and outer as most central to Kant’s disagreement with Leibniz, I argue that the pair of matter and form provides the starting point of Kant’s criticism. I further draw on incongrunet counterparts in order to illustrate the kind of difference space as a whole makes, and why Kant sees the need for a world-first view.

3. "Grasping Incongruence: Kant's Argument in §13 of the Prolegomena"

In §13 of the Prolegomena Kant argues that incongruent counterparts pose a paradox for a view according to which space and time are qualities of things in themselves. He argues that a solution of this paradox requires that objects must be thought of as appearances. I reconstruct Kant's argument drawing on the way in which he contrasts his model of cognition to Leibniz's in the Amphiboly. I argue that incongruent counterparts pose a paradox for a view according to which the intellect is the sole faculty of cognition because such a view conceptualizes the objects as being independent of one another. And I motivate Kant's solution, which says that the inner determination of such objects is only possible through their outer relation to space, as saying that our grasp of the difference between a left and a right hand reveals the need for a model according to which objects are conceptualized as parts of a common world, and that this is ensured by taking our understanding to be conditioned by space as the form of our sensibility.

4. "Kant's Conception of Form in the Inaugural Dissertation"

Drawing on two of Kant's pre-critical writings, his Nova Dilucidatio from 1755, and his essay The Only Possible Proof of the Existence of God from 1763, I argue that the conception of form that Kant puts forward in his Inaugural Dissertation from 1770 is intended to address one of the main issues he sees in Leibniz's philosophy. According to Leibniz's conception of substances, objects cannot genuinely interact with one another and form a real unity. Any appearance of such a relation and unity is merely due to a pre-established harmony. In trying to work out a conception of substances that makes possible their actual outward relatability and true unity, I explain how Kant's conception of form grows out of the attempt to address this problem.

5. "Against the Leibnizians: Euler and Kant on Absolute Space"

In a short essay from 1748, Euler argues for an absolutist conception of space. The basis for his argument is Newton's first law of mechanics, the law of inertia. A few years later, in an essay from 1768, Kant also argues for an absolutist conception of space. But Kant bases his argument on more geometrical considerations. Kant comments in his essay on Euler's argument saying that although Euler points to a difficulty with the major alternative conception to the Newtonian one, namely the Leibnizian conception, his argument fails as it leaves unconsidered the difficulties that come with the application of the laws of motion in the concrete. In this paper I compare Euler's and Kant's arguments and explain how Kant's argument accomplishes where he sees Euler's argument failing.

I have also been working on the following paper, which lies at the intersection of film and feminism:

6. “Repetition, reproduction”

Chantal Akerman's film Jeanne Dielman, 23 quai du Commerce, 1080 Bruxelles portrays painstakingly three days of the life of its eponymous character. The life of a housewife, Jeanne’s days take a highly routinized form. And so over the course of three hours and twenty one minutes, one sees Jeanne repeatedly washing the dishes, folding clothes, cleaning shoes, cooking meals, etc. In this paper, I discuss the significance of the repetitive structure of the film. Taking inspiration from Andreja Novakovic's remark that “What Akerman is after is what Marcel Proust calls ‘that unknowable thing’," and drawing on Simone de Beauvoir’s and Hannah Arendt's respective discussions of repetition and work, I argue that Akerman uses repetition as a way to portray the way in which Jeanne's, and more generally, a housewife's inner life commands respect.